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COMMON SENSE AND CONTRACT LAW:
FEAR OF A NORMATIVE PLANET?
Thomas W. Jool
I. HILL V. GATEWAY AND COMMON SENSE
The topic of this symposium, the role of "common sense"
in contract law, was inspired by a rhetorical question posed by
the Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Gateway 2000:2 "Where's the sense
in that?" The argument that contract law should follow
"common sense" seems rather innocuous, but it often provides
rhetorical cover for unspoken normative assumptions. This
observation is not meant to imply that contract law should, or
can, be free of normative baggage. Rather, I would simply
suggest we pay more attention to the role that normative
assumptions play in contract law.
Gateway was a class action suit customers brought against
a personal computer seller. According to the court, the nominal
plaintiffs, Rich and Enza Hill, 3 responded to a printed
advertisement by ordering a home computer by telephone from
Gateway 2000. When they received the computer, the shipping
box also contained a form stating additional terms not discussed
Acting Professor, School of Law, University of California, Davis (King
Hall). I would like to thank Deborah Post, former Chair of the AALS Section
on Contracts, for choosing the topic of the symposium and allowing me to
moderate the panel discussion. I owe a great debt to the panel participants,
John Conley, Shubha Ghosh, Beverly Horsburgh, and Lenora Ledwon, as well
as Deborah Post, for the fascinating discussions and email exchanges that
helped develop the symposium presentation and contributed greatly to this
Essay. Thanks to Ed Imwinkelreid and Deborah Post for their constructive
comments on earlier drafts, and thanks to the UC Davis School of Law and
Dean Rex Perschbacher for financial support of my attendance at the AALS
2000 Annual Meeting.
This Essay is dedicated to the memory of my father, Young Don Joo.
2 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1996).
3 Although the case was a class action, the court presents and analyzes the
facts as if the Hills were the only plaintiffs. Aside from the caption, the court
acknowledges that the case is a class action only in passing, when it states that
the Hills filed the original suit claiming "treble damages under RICO for the
Hills and a class of all other purchasers." Gateway, 1147 F.3d at 1148.
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over the phone. These terms included a clause requiring disputes
regarding the purchase to be submitted to arbitration. According
to the form, buyers were bound by these terms unless they
returned the computer within 30 days. The Hills stated that they
noticed the form, but did not read it carefully enough to notice
the arbitration clause.
The Hills did not return the computer. After more than
30 days had passed, they complained to Gateway about the
computer's performance and alleged that its components did not
match those advertised. When Gateway did not respond to their
satisfaction, the Hills filed suit. Gateway sought, and ultimately
obtained, enforcement of the arbitration clause. According to the
Seventh Circuit,4 the Hills became bound by the arbitration clause
by failing to return the computer within 30 days.
The Seventh Circuit's Gateway opinion relies on the idea
of "common sense" in at least two different ways. First, it
suggests that the Hills lacked common sense if they failed to
understand that their telephone conversation did not embody all
the terms of their contract with Gateway. A standard, traditional
application of contract law would characterize the phone call as
the formation of a sales contract, and the shipment of the
computer as performance of that contract. Under this view,
when the phone conversation ended, it was too late for either
party to unilaterally add or change the terms of the contract.5
According to the court, however, "Although this is one way a
contract could be formed, it is not the only way." 6 Following an
earlier Seventh Circuit case, ProCD v. Zeidenberg,7 the court
argued that in a consumer purchase, the vendor is the offeror,
who makes an offer by tendering the product. As "master of the
offer," Gateway could impose any conditions of acceptance,
including the accept-or-return condition.
' The district court had refused to enforce the arbitration clause. See id. at
1148.
1 Alternatively, the Hills offered to buy a computer and Gateway accepted by
performance by mailing one. By invoking UCC § 2-207, the Hills' lawyer
seems to have advocated this more complicated theory.
6 105 F.3d at 1148-49.
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Of course, this theory would fail if a contract of sale had
already been formed over the phone.8 The court attempts to
show that the Hills knew that the telephone conversation did not
constitute a contract. Of course, it does not argue that the Hills
were familiar with the ProCD rule. Nonetheless, according to
the court, "the Hills knew before they ordered the computer that
the carton would contain some important terms, and they did not
seek to discover these in advance." 9 The court apparently does
not mean that the Hills actually knew this, but rather that they
should have inferred it from Gateway's advertisement. Why,
according to the court, should the Hills have inferred this?
Because, according to the court, "Gateway's ads state that their
products come with limited warranties and lifetime support."0
Apparently, however, the ads, like the telephone agent, did not
8 In its analysis of formation, the Gateway court refuses to apply UCC § 2-
207. The court follows ProCD's odd insistence that § 2-207 does not apply
"when there is only one form," 105 F.3d at 1150, (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at
1452). This interpretation has no basis in the language of § 2-207, which
refers to communications that purport to accept an offer while varying its
terms. The Official Comment to § 2-207 notes the exchange of purchase and
acknowledgement forms as one example of a situation in which the section
applies, but the statute is not limited to the exchange of forms. The statute
makes no reference to "forms," and does not require even one form, much
less multiple forms. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9896 at 16-21 (D. Kan., June 15, 2000) (criticizing Hill v. Gateway and
denying Gateway's motion to dismiss based on a similar arbitration clause);
Thomas McCarthy et al., Survey: Uniforn Comnercial Code, 53 Bus. LAW.
1461, 1465-66 (1998). Prior cases, including at least one from the Seventh
Circuit, have applied § 2-207 where only one "form" was involved. See,
e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
The court's hostility to § 2-207 is not only unjustified, but also ironic. If
indeed the Hills and Gateway did not form a contract on the phone, § 2-207
provides a straightforward argument for Gateway. Gateway could argue that
the Hills offered to purchase a computer. By mailing the computer with
additional terms, Gateway can be said to have tendered an acceptance that was
"expressly conditional" on the Hills' assent to the additional terms - that is, it
was in effect a counteroffer that included an arbitration provision. Cf. Klocek
v. Gateway, supra, at 26-27. By keeping the computer, the Hills accepted this
counteroffer.
9 105 F.3d at 1150.10Id.
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mention arbitration. The court seems to suggest that because
Gateway's ads mention warranties and product support, the Hills
should have surmised that their purchase could be subject to any
number of other additional terms not mentioned in the ads or by
the telephone agent. It was up to the Hills to ask the agent about
undisclosed terms."I
Second, the court argues that the law must make "sense,"
by which it means something very specific: legal rules must
maximize wealth. The Hills argued that ProCD should be
restricted to contracts involving software, but the court scoffed,
"where's the sense in that?"' According to the court, disclosing
the terms over the phone would be costly to vendors and would
bore and discourage customers, thus harming both classes. 3 The
court implies that contract formation and terms are based on
whether they make "sense" and not on whether they are actually
assented to; and, further, that the Hills, as reasonable buyers,
should have known this. There is no finding that the Hills
actually knew that efficiency required the telephone clerks to
omit important terms, that they knew that a judicial analysis of
contract formation would rely on a principle of wealth
maximization rather than on the Hills' own manifestations of
assent, or that the Hills based their contracting choices on long-
term wealth maximization rather than on short-term rent-seeking
considerations.
"The court cites Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) as
another example of a "commercial transaction in which people pay for
products with terms to follow." Gateway, 103 F.3d at 1148. In Carnival,
passengers purchased cruise ship tickets by mail and subsequently challenged a
forum-selection clause printed on the ticket. The Court held that the clause
was enforceable. Carnival differs significantly from ProCD and Gateway,
however, in that the Carnival Court specifically stated, "we do not address the
question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the forum clause before
entering the contract for passage. Respondents essentially have conceded that
they had notice. . . ." 499 U.S. at 590.
12 105 F.3d at 1149.
" See id. Ultimately, of course, someone must pay the cost of
disclosure/nondisclosure. Although the court purports to reduce costs, the
court's rule does not, and cannot, eliminate the cost of disclosure. Rather, it
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The Gateway court posits a model of "sensible" human
behavior. The court evaluates the reasonableness of both the
conduct and contractual expectations of the parties against this
model. 14 Gateway's expectations accorded with common sense,
while the Hills harbored deviant expectations; thus it is only
natural that Gateway wins and the Hills lose. That is, according
to the court, the law's presumptions about contractual
expectations reflect not only the result favored by the law, but
also the natural tendency of most people.
One problem with this approach is that judges' models of
baseline human behavior are colored by their personal experience
and ideological leanings. Doesn't everyone know that a vendor
taking phone orders can't be bothered to disclose all the terms of
sale? On the other hand, doesn't everyone know that when I
agree to buy something over the phone, I agree only to the terms
discussed in the phone call? Legal doctrine has no methods of its
own for describing and modeling human behavior and
expectations.
Hill v. Gateway, of course, follows the influential Seventh
Circuit practice of importing the model of the "rational person"
from neoclassical economics. The neoclassical law and
economics approach assumes as a descriptive matter that the
process of self-interested bargaining yields efficient outcomes.' 5
Hence, it suggests that the efficiency of terms is itself evidence
that most parties would have assented to them. One reason the
14 Professor Barnett is the most prominent academic proponent of the use of
"common sense" in contract law. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992)
("To the extent that judges are selected from the relevant community of
discourse, they may discover the commonsense understanding of the parties-
particularly the understanding of rationally ignorant parties-by
introspection."); Randy Barnett, ...And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 421, 430 (1993) ("For most of what anyone takes for
granted, everyone takes for granted."). To his credit, rather than casually
assuming that "common sense" should govern contractual interpretation,
Professor Barnett makes clear that his concept of "common sense" is based
on a normative concept - that contractual legitimacy must derive from
consent.
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Hills "knew" that additional terms would be in the box was that,
according to the court, such was the more efficient practice.
Thus it is unnecessary to examine assent directly. Because
freedom of contract results in efficient terms, efficiency and
assent are effectively collapsed into a single inquiry.
The rational behavior hypothesis is often criticized for
being overly simplistic, and for lacking empirical basis. In this
symposium, Professor Ledwon argues that in application, the
description of the "rational person" suffers from a "failure of
imagination" - that the describer tends to describe him or
herself. Professor Ghosh claims that the rational behavior
hypothesis suffers, rather, from an overabundance of
imagination, in that it describes a world too unlike the one in
which we actually live. The participants in this symposium
suggest (among other things) that other nonlegal disciplines can
assist the law in building more nuanced and empirically accurate
models of human behavior.
II. THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF BEHAVIORAL
DESCRIPTIONS
It is certainly a worthy, and necessary, project to expose
the law's facile assumptions about human behavior. It is a
standard legal argument to support a preferred result on the
ground that it reflects normal human.behavior and expectations:
"The law should reflect X (e.g., efficiency, reasonableness,
compassion, usage of trade) because people naturally follow X."
The descriptive part of the argument helps disguise the normative
part of the argument. 16 But it is not enough to ask, or even,
indeed, to answer, the empirical question of how people actually
behave.' 7 Regardless of who has the most descriptively accurate
model of behavior, the question remains "Why should we care?"
16 Professor Leff painted a convincing picture of neoclassical law and
economics doing exactly this in his review of Judge Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
"7 Judge Posner, for example, has criticized behavioral economics as mere
description without predictive capability. See Richard A. Posner, Behavioral
1042 [Vol 16
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Because this symposium takes Hill v. Gateway as its
starting point, I use the rational behavior model as an example.
But this essay is not intended as an anti-rational choice screed.
Rather, it is intended to draw attention to the parallel normative-
positive structure, which is by no means unique to the
neoclassical model. Judges have long invoked the standard of the
"reasonable man [sic]," which purports to encompass both what
we would do and what we should do. Any legal theory that seeks
results consonant with human nature tends to engage in the same
practice. 1
Is a law favoring behavior X good because people
naturally engage in X? This seems to assume that law's main
goal is to serve individual liberty. In this vein, both critics and
some defenders of the neoclassical law and economics approach
have argued that it serves human freedom because it is grounded
in individual consent. 19  The efficient legal rule serves the
Economics and the Lmv, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558-59 (1998). I do not
mean to suggest that the symposium participants are solely concerned with
modeling behavior. Professor Ghosh, in particular, specifically renounces that
approach. Nor do I mean to suggest that modeling behavior is an unworthy
exercise. Rather, the point is that normativity is a necessary bridge between
describing behavior and law.
18 So, as you read this essay, feel free to substitute the name of your least-
favorite behavioral assumption for each instance of "rational behavior model."
My colleague Ed Imwinkelreid points out that Llewellyn employed a kind of
normative-positive argument in his anaylsis of form contracts. Llewellyn
wrote:
Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boilerplate clauses, we
can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no
assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically,
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the
transaction, but one thing more. That one thing more is a
blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any nor unreasonable
or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960) (emphasis added).
19 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Edical and Political Basis for the Eficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Leff,
Realism About Nominalism, supra note 16.
2000 1043
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libertarian goal because, by hypothesis, people naturally tend to
reach efficient contracts in the absence of law.
Lawmaking based on a descriptive model of behavior
seems less true to the libertarian ideal, however, if we look
critically at the limits of a generalized description of human
behavior. Such a model can, at best, predict with certainty what
most people would do most of the time, but not what any
particular individual would have done at any given time. The
neoclassical law and economics approach, for example, is
founded on the assumption that, as a general matter, people
bargain to efficient results. It does not inquire into whether
specific parties-the Hills and Gateway, for example -
subjectively agreed to such an efficient result in a given
instance." Nor does it account for the possibility that in some
20 The Gateway court's imputation of assent is similar in structure to Judge
Posner's assertion that if I buy a lottery ticket and lose, I have consented to the
loss. See Posner, Ethical and Political Basis for the Efficiency Norm, supra
note 19. But I have not literally agreed to lose money. Indeed I may not have
even agreed to run the risk of losing money, as I may have "wildly
overestimated" my chances of winning. See Ronald Dworkin, Why
Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HoFsTRA L.
REV. 563 (1980). Rather, the claim is that had I been a reasonably informed
and logical person (whatever that means) I would have known what I was
getting into; therefore I should have known what I was getting into; therefore,
I should be treated as f I assented. This is simply an example of the classic
"constructive" or "objective" theory of assent: For the classic critique of this
approach, see Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 4 HARV. L. REv. 553
(1933).
A relevant example of the objective theory is Professor Baird's argument
that contractual silence (that is, a failure to object to contract terms) allows us
to infer consent just as the dog that didn't bark allowed Sherlock Holmes to
infer the identity of a "midnight visitor." See Douglas G. Baird, Self- Interest
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 593 (1990)
(citing Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE
MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1894)), quoted in Barnett, The Sound of
Silence, supra note 14, at 821.
Because no one reported the watchdog barking, Holmes surmised that the
visitor must have been someone familiar to the dog, and the dog must have
"consented" to the visitor's presence.
His legendary deductive skills notwithstanding, Holmes leaped to his
conclusion a bit rashly in this case. His conclusion depends on many
unspoken assumptions that are difficult, if not impossible, to prove. If the dog
[Vol 161044
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cases, the parties subjectively agreed to an inefficient result, or
that, due to their idiosyncrasies or ignorance, they "would have
agreed to" such a result.'
The Gateway opinion refers to the Hills by name, but the
decision is really not about their individual assent; it about the
hypothetical rational assent of a hypothetical rational plaintiff.
Recall also a crucial fact that the opinion steadfastly ignores: the
case was a class action. The large number of plaintiffs makes
analysis of subjective assent all but impossible. Moreover, in a
class action, even if Rich and Enza Hill's subjective assent were
established, that assent would be woefully insufficient to decide
the case on behalf of the entire class. Indeed, if subjective assent
plays any significant role in contract information, it is worth
asking whether there can even be such a thing as a class action in
"contract" law. Yet the Gateway court bases its entire opinion
on an analysis of the Hills' assent. How is this possible?
Because although Rich and Enza Hill are very real people, "the
Hills" of Hill v. Gateway, and their "subjective assent," are no
more than metaphorical constructs."
consented to a stranger's passing, it violated its master's normative directives
("common sense"). That is, if the visitor was a stranger, the dog should have
withheld consent and barked. But this does not prove that the dog did consent
to the visitor's presence. Holmes had to assume, for example, that the dog
was so "rational" (well-trained) that it was incapable of violating its master's
will; that a stranger did not obtain the dog's "consent" by coercion (a muzzle)
or fraud (a juicy steak or a disguise); that the dog had perfect information
(e.g., that the dog was not dozing, heedless, or ignorant); and that Holmes
himself had perfect information (e.g., that the witnesses were correct in stating
that the dog did not bark, an unprovable negative).
A similar analysis applies to the argument that the Gateway plaintiffs
assented to the arbitration clause by failing to object to it. Perhaps they should
have registered an objection, and the law should allocate to them the cost of
failing to do so. But this is a normative conclusion that differs from the
descriptive statement that they did subjectively assent to the clause.
2 For an exploration of "would have been inefficient" scenarios, see Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989).
2 It might be argued that even if "what most people would have done" is not
necessarily what the parties would have done, it is at least what they most
likely would have done. Since it is usually impossible to reliably judge
subjective intent, this is the closest we can come to realizing the ideal of
2000 1045
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The contracts casebook chestnut Jacob & Youngs v. Kentz3
provides a similar example of abstract, constructive "intent" that
predates the modern rational behavior model. Justice Cardozo
openly admitted that his decision was based on "[c]onsiderations
partly of justice and partly of presumable intention" - and not at
all on actual intention. Although the contract specified that the
builder was to use pipes manufactured by the Reading
Manufacturing Company, Cardozo found that this was not a
condition of the contract. A normal person wouldn't condition
payment for a house on such a criterion, or indeed place any
monetary value on it. Consequently, the owner had to pay the
full contract price despite the builder's use of the wrong pipe.
My point is not to advocate a purely subjective measure of
assent. Of course, subjective assent is often beyond proof. But
that suggests only that gap-filling based primarily on actual
consensual obligation. However, Hill v. Gateway elides the distinction
between actual subjective intent and a second-best approximation of it: the
opinion completely collapses the question of actual subjective assent into the
"objective" question of efficiency.
Judge Posner has suggested that efficiency-minded judges should take
precisely the opposite approach: he has argued that if the court believes the
parties' intended result is not the most efficient result, the court must be
wrong. The court should stick with the parties' intent, which is surely the
truly efficient bargain. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 15, at 105. This approach tacitly serves libertarian goals without ever
questioning the primacy of efficiency, by *positing that the efficient and
libertarian results are always the same (of course this approach does not
address the problem of how to determine the parties' intended result). Judge
Posner has elsewhere presented the mirror image of this argument,
maintaining that efficiency is an ethically superior basis for lawmaking, in part
because it incorporates mutual consent. See Posner, Ethical and Political
Basis for the Efficiency Norm, supra note 19.
23 230 N.Y. 239 (1921). The contract for construction of a home required the
builder to use plumbing pipe manufactured by the Reading Manufacturing
Company. After the house was complete, the owner discovered that the
builder had breached the contract by using pipe that was substantively identical
but manufactured by a different company. Curing the defect would require
the costly step of tearing down the walls. The owner refused to pay the
builder the outstanding balance on the contract. Cardozo held that the
builder's failure to use the correct pipe did not entitle the owner to withhold
the balance of the contract price - in fact, it did not entitle the owner to
withhold any part of the balance.
1046 [Vol 16
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individual consent is impossible to realize in practice;"' it does
not establish that an efficiency standard is equivalent to an
"actual consent" standard.
So the use of "normal" human behavior (whether rational
behavior or any other model) as a standard may promote
libertarianism but it may also serve its nemesis, majoritarianism.
According to the Gateway court, the Hills should have assented
to the accept-or-return device because it is efficient; therefore
they constructively did assent. Could they rebut the presumption
of majoritarian expectations with proof that they genuinely
entertained deviant expectations (i.e., unlike most folks, they do
not make Kaldor-Hicks efficient bargains)? Apparently not; the
court (like most courts) is uninterested in their subjective
expectations. Enforcing a contract in accord with the
expectations of most people rewards conformist expectations and
punishes nonconformist expectations. As every good law-and-
economist knows, a judicial decision that sets majority sentiment
as the default rule today will put all tomorrow's deviants on
notice that they should bargain around the default rule; thus
future deviants who do not explicitly contract around the default
rule can be presumed, like non-deviants, to have subjectively
assented to it.2 However, that theory, even if we accept it,
24 Professor Barnett has maintained that contract law derives its legitimacy
from the consensual nature of contract: the idea that, except in extreme cases,
persons should only be held to obligations they have taken on voluntarily. See
Randy Barnett, ...And Contractual Consent, supra note 14. I agree that the
consent is the central idea that gives contract law its legitimacy - this is why
it is so important for the law to impute c6nsent. But in hard cases, the law
uses only the rhetoric of consent, invoking its power without meeting its
requirements. Where consent is entirely imputed on the basis that the parties
"should have" consented without evidence that the parties subjectively
consented, the principle of voluntarism is being invoked in name only. The
prevalence of such cases demonstrates the power of consent as a legitimating
principle, but also shows how it is honored in the breach.
I Professor Barnett, who distinguishes himself from law-and-economists,
endorses essentially the same approach. See id. at 431 ("Consent may still
justify the use of conventionalist default rules where no [shared tacit]
assumptions exist.. .one-time contracting parties may be making a conventional
assumption, while the other party-often a repeat player guided by legal
counsel-is not."). Note that Professor Barnett seems to favor a penalty
default rule against sophisticated repeat players in order to give them incentive
2000 1047
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focuses on the contractual freedom of future parties and not on
that of the Hills and their class - who are, after all, the parties
before the court. It sounds communitarian, rather than
libertarian, to sacrifice today's litigants, deviant though they may
be, to enhance the contractual liberty of future parties .26
Another possible explanation of the significance of a
descriptive model of human behavior is that it is simply icing on
the cake. That is, X is not good because everyone does it (or
because most people do it). Rather, X is good because X is
good; by the way, people do X anyway, but even if they don't, X
is still good. This pattern is evident in the following example of
religious natural law reasoning: "[M]ost people believe that
promises should be kept and lying is wrong because those norms
are revealed truths affirmed by the foundational religious texts of
our culture." 2 Again we see the same two elements: people do
X and X is good. But the relationship between them is reversed.
X is not good because all (or most) people do it, as libertarianism
(or majoritarianism) would have it. Rather, people do X because
X is good. There is a bit of circularity here: people do X
because it's good, and the fact that people do it is evidence that it
is good. But it's only partly circular: the fact that people do X is
ancillary evidence that X is good, but it is not itself the reason
that X is good. It is good because the ultimate authority, namely
God, has told us so.
to reveal their "unconventional" assumptions in future transactions. Cf. Ayres
and Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 21. The Gateway court, however,
directs the penalty in the opposite direction, penalizing the consumer for
harboring assumptions that conflict with the "sensible" assumptions of the
sophisticated repeat player. This difference of course underscores the
indeterminacy of the concept of common sense.
26 Of course this criticism applies to the very idea of "objective"
manifestations of contractual assent, and thus is not at all limited to the
neoclassical law and economics approach.
27 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of
Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV.
741, 752 (1998). This is consistent with Russell Kirk's description of Burke's
view of natural law as "human custom conforming to divine intent." RUSSELL
KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 50 (7th ed. 1993)
(quoted in Bainbridge, supra, at 751).
1048 [Vol 16
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Natural law theorists are comfortable grounding their
arguments on ultimate normative truths because of their unusual
willingness to admit that they believe that ultimate normative
truths a) exist, and b) have been "revealed" to humanity?5
Secular legal theorists (and I count myself among them),
however, are squeamish about saying, "People should do X
because X is good."29 In the absence of a superhuman normative
arbiter, it is hard to speak of normative assumptions as anything
more than fungible preferences?0 Knowing this, we are usually
too embarrassed to admit it when we make normative
assumptions.3 ' After all, the Realists have taught us well that the
' While natural law theorists are refreshingly upfront about (a), they are a bit
vague about how (b) works. Even those who agree that divine will has been
revealed disagree mightily as to what those revelations are, so only the
broadest moral truths can be said with any confidence to have been clearly
revealed. Professor Bainbridge himself adheres to a school of natural law that
invokes "practical reason" as well as revelation, see Bainbridge, supra note
27, at 754-55, which, I believe, takes us out of the natural law frying pan and
back into the common sense fire.
29 Some efficiency theorists in effect do this by articulating contract rules that
enhance efficiency regardless of whether those rules reflect the parties'
preferences. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 21. But
they often refuse to declare efficiency a normatively superior goal, leaving it
to the judgment of lawmakers. See id. (stating that their framework may be
attractive to "efficiency-minded lawmakers").
Other scholars openly encourage judges and other lavanakers to pursue
normative goals in contract law. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1815,
1878-79 (1991). Professor Charny suggests that contract law should be aimed
at modifying the behavior of future transactors, not at simulating the parties'
hypothetical behavior. If future transactors will be able to bargain around the
court's interpretation, "the court should choose the interpretation that will
induce parties to expend the least effort in bargaining around the court's
interpretation." Id. at 1878. If future transactors will not bargain around the
interpretation, however, the court should use its own judgment to choose the
interpretation that will modify future behavior in a socially desirable way.
I See, e.g., Leff, supra note 16 ("Normative preferences are just that; they
don't get any more proved by being talked about").
31 A notable exception is Judge Posner's defense of efficiency as an ethically
superior ground for lawmaking. See Posner, Ethical and Political Basis for
the Efficiency Norm, supra note 19. Professor Barnett has maintained in many
of his works that the basis for contractual obligation should be (and is)
consent. See, e.g., Barnett, The Sound of Silence, supra note 14.
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winners among such preferences, triumph not from logical or
"legal" processes, but from sheer political power. This, I
suppose, helps to explain why secularists find such comfort in
evidence that our preferred normative schemes are consistent
with human behavior. The state's imposition of norm X, though
by its very nature an exercise of power, is a relatively harmless
one when its net result is pretty much what people would have
done on their own anyway.32
III. CONCLUSION
Again, my purpose in this essay is not simply to add to
the fusillade of potshots aimed at the rational behavior model.
Rather, I mean to point out that any purportedly descriptive
model of human behavior-including those supported by
empirical evidence and including any hypothetical perfectly
accurate model-can mean nothing without normative principles
to tell us why the model matters. Of course contract law will
never uniformly adopt a single principle, or even a fixed priority
among principles. But at the very least, academics and
lawmakers should be as upfront as possible about their normative
assumptions and not hide behind the "objectivity" of science.
In academic writing, we may discuss the consequences of
normative precept X without having to take an express position
on its relative merits: we can state that the law should seek result
A if society values X.33 We can add to the normative appeal of
X, while still avoiding express normativity, by making the
nominally descriptive assertion (preferably, but not necessarily,
with some empirical support) that most people tend toward X.
For the sake of intellectual honesty, we should avoid hiding in
the agnostic closet. For judges, legislators, and other
32 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? An Economic and Political
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 544 (1990) (dismissing the significance of
many rules of corporate law on the ground that explicit contracting would have
yielded the same rules).
" Judge Posner very carefully does this in the early part of Economic Analysis
of Law. Elsewhere, however, he has made a spirited defense of efficiency as
the normatively superior goal of lawmaking. See Posner, Ethical and Political
Basis for the Efficiency Norm, supra note 19.
1050 [Vol 16
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/3
FEAR OFA NORMATIVE PLANET
lawmakers, it is even more important to step out into the
sunshine. They may not make their support for result A
conditional on societal normative preference; they must choose A
(or B) and live with its normative implications.-,
If the meaning of a contract can be derived from things
that we all know and do, why do parties need courts at all? The
parties should be able to figure things out on their own. Perhaps
parties come to court only after they have exhausted the
possibilities of their shared standards. They have given up on the
possibility of a result that reflects their common understanding.
Instead, they hope the court can provide some other standard of
dispute resolution. Maybe a coin flip, as long as the flipper is
impartial. Some of Professor Bernstein's work has pointed in
this direction. 5 She argues against the incorporation of "course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance" into UCC
adjudication. Commercial transactors who end up in court have
already tried trade practice, and it has failed. They do not want a
court to reapply 'the same standards they themselves have found
wanting. Rather, they want the law, as a legitimate and
dispassionate outsider, to break the tie.
The outcome will presumably have some effect on
people's future behavior. In addition, the normative assumptions
communicated through the outcome can at some level affect
people's values as well.36 That is, the court does not merely
reflect "common sense," but also creates it. This process would
I Granted, result A may be justifiable on multiple alternative normative
grounds, giving the judge some normative anonymity.
11 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Lmv in a Merchant Court, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1765 (1996). While Professor Ellickson presented evidence that
members of a community prefer to resolve disputes by local custom, see
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErLE
DISPUTES (1991), Professor Bernstein cites examples suggesting that where
local custom fails, community members may be willing to submit to "outside"
standards.
36 Professor Danzig argued that the way a legal system answers fundamental
questions about rights and redress "reflects the values of the people who
control that system. Equally significantly, the constantly articulated,
repeatedly implemented answers to those questions shape the values of all who
are affected by that system." RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN
CONTRACT LAw: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES 1 (1978).
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be more honest, and perhaps even more effective, if lawmakers
were candid about their normative assumptions. If you're
standing on a soapbox, why not speak out loud and clear?
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/3
